Effective defense against chemical and biological threats requires an "end-to-end" strategy that encompasses the entire problem space, from threat assessment and target hardening to response planning and recovery. A key element of the strategy is the definition of appropriate system requirements for surveillance and detection of threat agents. Our end-toend approach to venue chem/bio defense is captured in the Facilities Weapons of Mass Destruction Decision Analysis Capability (FacDAC), an integrated system-of-systems toolset that can be used to generate requirements across all stages of detector development. For example, in the early stage of detector development the approach can be used to develop performance targets (e.g., sensitivity, selectivity, false positive rate) to provide guidance on what technologies to pursue. In the development phase, after a detector technology has been selected, the approach can aid in determining performance trade-offs and down-selection of competing technologies. During the application stage, the approach can be employed to design optimal defensive architectures that make the best use of available technology to maximize system performance. This presentation will discuss the end-to-end approach to defining detector requirements and demonstrate the capabilities of the FacDAC toolset using examples from a number of studies for the Department of Homeland Security.
INTRODUCTION
As recently highlighted by the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism report 1 , the threat of terrorism using weapons of mass destruction (WMD), such as biological or chemical weapons, remains a credible threat even though the United States has not experienced an attack since the anthrax letter mailings of 2001. Effective defense against chemical and biological threats requires a comprehensive "end-to-end" strategy that considers the entire problem space, from surveillance and detection to threat assessment, target hardening, response planning, and recovery. The approach begins by understanding the likely threats that the defensive system will be designed to protect against and the probable targets of those threats. Target vulnerabilities are assessed, and hardening actions and countermeasures are evaluated for their ability to reduce the likelihood or impact of an attack. Detection and surveillance systems are designed to provide information to trigger countermeasures. The deployment and design of these defense architectures is optimized to ensure broad system coverage and the delivery of actionable information. Finally, restoration and recovery strategies assist in returning the target to normal operations as quickly as possible after an attack.
Significant effort and focus has been placed on the creation of detection and monitoring systems to inform or enable protection measures that reduce and prevent exposure following an attack 2, 3 . As investments continue to be made in the development and deployment of future detection technologies, system requirements must be established with the entire end-to-end scope in mind to ensure that systems are adequately addressing mission objectives.
This paper provides an overview and illustrates the benefit of using an end-to-end approach to defining chemical and biological detector requirements for all phases of the detector development process. The discussion will begin by introducing the Facilities Weapons of Mass Destruction Decision Analysis Capability (FacDAC) toolset developed by Sandia National Laboratories to model chemical and biological defense systems. Next, Sandia's end-to-end approach to evaluate detector systems and develop requirements will be discussed in detail. Finally, the approach's applicability will be demonstrated in various stages of the detector development process including guidance for early-stage technology investment, development-stage system evaluation, and application and deployment of assets.
FACDAC CHEM/BIO VENUE PROTECTION MODELING TOOLSET
FacDAC is an integrated system-of-systems toolset that enables the simulation of indoor and outdoor chemical and biological incidents and responses. Modules featured in the toolset include facility geometry, HVAC and indoor airflow models, simulated attacks, population movement, exposure and disease progression models, outdoor dispersion models, public health care network, facility response options, signal interpretation, and detection systems. Coupling of the individual modules allows for biological and chemical attacks and responses to be characterized from initial release to resolution. The primary components of FacDAC include models that capture airflow movement within and outside facilities, contamination transport, population movement throughout a building, and toxic chemical and biological agent health effects (e.g., dose-response curves and disease progression models). The airflow models provide accurate representation of air movements through a building. Contaminant transport models account for the dispersion, filtration by air handling systems, deposition via gravitational settling, and other loss processes involved during a release. Population movement models capture the passage of people throughout a facility. To account for variations in paths taken by individuals through venues, a probabilistic approach is used. Each person entering a facility was assigned a unique schedule that could include points of entry and exit, and time waiting in designated areas (e.g., ticketing, security checkpoints, and boarding areas). Moreover, the dimensions of doorways and stairs were explicitly included in the population models as they can create resistance to movements of large populations (i.e., bottlenecks). Health effects models characterize the impact of toxic chemicals and biological agents on a diverse population. The amount of chemical or biological agent exposure that each person receives was determined by the release location, release size, release time, agent transport through the facility, and each person's movement through the facility.
To account for variations in weather and building operations, a Monte Carlo approach is used to build a library of building "states" that encompass a broad range of operating conditions.. Parameters such as the outdoor temperature and wind direction, the efficiency of filtration in the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) system, and whether or not doors are open or closed within a facility will have significant impacts on air flows. By placing probability distributions on these parameters and running simulations, a database of hundreds of thousands of scenarios is generated for use in analyses. FacDAC analyses consider these variations to ensure requirements are robust and not dependent on a single set of operating conditions.
APPROACH TO DEVELOP DETECTOR REQUIREMENTS
When defining detector requirements, it is important to choose an appropriate metric for evaluating performance and to quantify whether a architecture satisfies the overall objectives of the program. Types of metrics employed to evaluate chemical and biological detection system deployments vary; however, two categories of metrics are frequently used: impact-based and mass-based. Impact-based metrics capture the outcomes and consequences of attacks (e.g., number of infected people), while mass-based metrics characterize the size of release (e.g., one kilogram). . A main advantage of using impact-based metrics to evaluate detector requirements and performance is that focus is on mass releases that have significant impact and can also be mitigated (i.e., mass releases that do not have significantly impact will be deemphasized). In the work discussed in this paper, the impact-based metrics used include the number of people who would be intoxicated (for chemicals) or infected (for biological agents) and the "impact reduction," which is the difference in the number of casualties resulting from detection and response compared to no detection. The number of people infected or intoxicated can be determined from standard dose-response curves that relate agent exposure to health effects (e.g., infected or incapacitated). The "impact reduction" metric is especially useful for evaluating early warning detection systems that must be coupled with an effective response to protect populations. This metric is computed by The process of detector development contains of detector development involves the definitio the detection system and the establishment o system. Performance targets include the sen detector to discern target agents from back technologies have been selected and their p performance trade-off analyses are conducte system goals. The application stage involve environment. The end-to-end approach to de by walking through the process in detail for th A schematic view of the major components i develop is featured in Figure 1 . To appropr understanding of the threat the detection system the system. Aspects of the threat can be comp span a representative threat space over which response environment will also assist in defin produce to trigger a response. Key informa critical decisions that must be made my decis the information must be received in order to i community delivered in terms of key decision of conceptual architectures to use in generatin the current state of technology can be combine a particular component of the architecture ar architecture will need to be modified so that detection requirements can be labeled as favor t would result from a specific attack if no external respons that self-evacuation and people-triggered evacuation, du tated people, are explicitly included in the analysis. The d ith detection plus response is then determined and used to s three major stages: early, development, and application. on of specific performance targets needed to satisfy the ove of guidance on potential technologies to pursue for incor nsitivity of the detector to identify agents of interest, se kground, and false positive rates. In the development performance is evaluated. Competing technologies are ed to determine, which technology is most applicable to es the deployment of developed detection systems into th eveloping biological and chemical detector requirements w he first stage of the detector development process.
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In the case of an indoor facility, several variab size, and airflow state of the building. The ex potential release locations are postulated thro varied over a credible range that is informed b of parameters including, but not limited to: th inside the facility.
Following generation of the library of potenti evaluating the mitigating effect of different res are a variety of response strategies that could HVAC shutdown, HVAC purge, closing of fi given response action can vary greatly depe response is initiated. Figure 2 provides a repr given attack scenario.
Response effectiveness (i.e., the percentage o response initiated. "High-consequence" respo response to some attacks, but this response is positives. On the other hand, "low-consequen system for indoor facilities. While this type of less effective response. Moreover, the poor actions could even lead to increases in casual evacuating persons through a cloud of toxic ag than others, and that there is an increased bene FacDAC, a unique response effectiveness curv The database of response effectiveness assists given application and over what time frame mitigating the attack.
Fig 2. Representative illustration of
indicates the time after the in was taken. The y-axis is the ses will use to determine requirements across all stages following approach. The method begins with the creation e threat scenarios. Next, a database of response effectivene d the attack scenario library. Finally, detector architecture he detection system as a function of detector performanc bles define the attack scenario library including the release l xact location of a potential attack cannot be determined a p oughout the facility at regularly-spaced intervals. Releas by the threat. The airflow state of the building can be captur e outdoor temperature, HVAC operating condition, and the ial attack scenarios, a database of the response effectivene sponses on each attack scenario at various response initiatio be implemented to mitigate effects of toxic agents, includ ire doors, and activation of wet fire suppression systems. ending on the properties of the agent and how soon afte resentative illustration of response effectiveness versus initi of causalities averted) depends both on the response time onses, such as full evacuation of a facility, might provide a less acceptable when employing a detector system with a h nce" responses may involve changing the amount of fresh a f response provides a higher tolerance of false positives, it m r response (bottom curve) in Figure 2 demonstrates that lties (e.g., venting toxic agents to populations located outs gent). Overall, it is evident that some response actions are efit to initiating the response quickly to maximize the effec ve for each scenario in the library is created and combined in quantifying types of response actions that would be mos e the response action must be initiated to have a reaso f response effectiveness curves for a given attack scenario. Using the databases of attack scenarios and response effectiveness, conceptual detector architectures are optimized and their effectiveness evaluated. The optimization process for determining detector locations is based on the evaluation of impact-based metrics for various postulated detector locations. The metric discussed in the following example is the number of casualties averted through agent detection and initiation of a response. For a given postulated detector location, the scenarios are individually evaluated to determine if any detector is able to detect the presence of the agent and at what time (post-release) this detection occurs. The number of causalities that result without detection is determined for every scenario in the attack library. For scenarios that were detected, the algorithm determines the number of casualties that still occur even after initiating a given response at the detection time, and the casualty difference between detected scenarios with and without response is recorded. This difference in casualties is the metric used to evaluate the benefit of deploying the detection system at the postulated locations. New detector locations are postulated and the above mentioned process is repeated until the detection architecture that produces the largest mean reduction in casualties is found. At this point the detection architecture is considered optimized.
Using the optimized detection architecture, the value of the system, measured in terms of number of causalities averted, can be evaluated as a function of detector performance parameters, such as limit of detection, number of detectors, and agent properties. The resulting performance curves are used in subsequent analysis, discussed in-depth in the remaining sections of this paper, to determine detector requirements. Having now introduced the approach to evaluate detector performance parameters, discussion in the next section of this paper will demonstrate how the approach can be used to aid in the determination of which technologies to pursue in early-stage detector development process.
EARLY-STAGE DETECTOR DEVELOPMENT: TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENT GUIDANCE
Detector system requirements are frequently interrelated and their performance can be traded off against each other to meet specific performance criteria. For example, increasing the sensitivity of the detector could increase the performance of the detection system, but it could also increase the cost of the system. Alternatively, by holding the system costs fixed, one might be able to reach the same level of performance with a greater number of less sensitive but in expensive detectors. Understanding the performance space available for trade-offs between requirements can assist detector designers in potentially excluding from further consideration technologies that demonstrate performance outside the space. The process for determining the trade-space available begins by defining the minimum level of acceptable performance for each requirement of the system. After determining the minimum level of performance additional sections of the trade-space can be examined. For example, there exists a point in the performance parameter spectrum when, for a given application, the benefits of additional improvements in performance will saturate and a diminishing return on investment occurs. Improving the parameter beyond this value will not produce a significant benefit in terms of system performance and represents an upper bound on desired performance.
Although it is useful for detector designers to know the minimum level of performance a system component must possess to be effective, understanding the performance range where the system is expected to give moderate-to-good performance assuming moderate values for other parameters can be even more beneficial. By defining these "reasonable" ranges, boundaries can be placed on the performance space in which trade-offs between specific objectives can be made. Moreover, the method can assist in quickly excluding from further consideration technologies that demonstrate performance below the designated reasonable range. All three important sections of the performance space mentioned above can be succinctly captured and displayed graphically through the use of a construct such as the one provided in Figure 3 . As discussed in Section 3, the value of the d examined by evaluating impact-based metrics credible attack scenarios. An example plot ge (LOD) for a given architecture (e.g., minimu reduction plotted as a function of the number o discussed in this paper, it was determined th deployed in the system. The point of dimini saturation for the minimum number of reason reduction in casualties for the three detector sy is specified by examining the minimum accep yielding a value of 100. Finally, the reasonab reasonable impact reduction to 50 percent of c detectors in the system, chosen as five in th example is presented in Figure 4b . Figure 4a , where the lim um agent concentration that must be detected) is varied of detectors employed in the detection network. In a previo hat a reasonable range of three to ten detectors could be shing returns for the LOD is specified as the initial point nable detectors. In Figure 4a , this occurs at approximate ystem, yielding a value of 10 -7
. Furthermore, the minimum ptable reduction of impact, chosen as ten percent for a ten d ble range of LOD performance is determined by setting th casualties averted and the upper limit to 90 percent for a g he example. The corresponding graphical requirements c ves saved by detection-triggered evacuation, relative to no action, ection (i.e., sensitivities) and number of detectors at a given detect uides for the eye and highlight the minimum desired reduction in eduction in causalities where the benefit of increased sensitivity b onding graphical requirement construct for the LOD. 
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Creating similar plots for additional performa be determined. Figure 5 features the results ex and displayed as a single system requiremen quickly and defensibly rule out the use of unr could be placed on more promising technolog values within the reasonable range may not sa is not an indication that the technology meets consider detection systems that incorporate thi detector components satisfy the system perfo Figure 5 also demonstrates how two competin technology, denoted by the black icon, has a m If the detector system was evaluated solely o within the reasonable range, but the first techn particularly at low release amounts. However technology has an unreasonable cost for the pr Providing detector developers with requirem technologies are most advantageous to pursu system allows for the potential discovery of te that the technology denoted by the black icon $100,000. This knowledge would provide de future research and development efforts could
DEVELOPMENT PHA
In the development phase of detector design approach can be used to compare competing t the required performance level. At this stage could satisfy the minimum and reasonable re method to compare the competing technologie method involves taking key detector performa ance parameters (e.g., cost) allows for system architecture xtracted from multiple parameterized performance plots co nt construct. A goal of early-stage detector requirement reasonable technologies in the detection system, so that dev gies. It is important to note at this time that technologies w atisfy the overall system objectives. Existence within the r the desired system performance, only that it is not unreason is technology. Additional analysis is needed to determine ormance objectives. This type of analysis will be presente ng technologies can be evaluated against the system requirem more sensitive LOD than the other technology, denoted by on the basis of its LOD performance it is clear that both nology is more sensitive and likely to detect a broader range r, evaluation of all the performance criteria shows that the m roposed detection system and should not be considered for t system requirement ranges. For a given detection architecture, th te the performance of different technologies under consideration fo ments shown in Figure 5 will serve as an aid in dete e. Moreover, the benefit of mapping the performance tra echnology or literature gaps. For example, the above illus n could potentially be used in a detection system if the cost efensible guidance to detector designers and program spo be focused.
ASE: EVALUATION OF SPECIFIC SYSTEM
n, after a set of detector technologies has been selected technologies and determine whether the detection architect of the detector development process, a number of competi equirements of the system. What is needed is a rigorous es against one another and the overall system performance g ance parameters that drive detector performance (e.g., cost, Detection TNne detection time) and plotting them on an iso-p example iso-performance chart, where every Figure 6 . The lines in the plot were created b single value of performance (e.g., percent caus generated from the initiation of a specific re generated with various detection times are performance plot in Figure 6 can be interpreted time of 4, and a cost of $100,000 provides id detection time of 8, and a cost of $25,000. technologies can be quickly and directly c objectives can be evaluated.
Fig 6.
Iso-performance plot depict point on the plot indicates tha detection system. Cost in thi combination of acquisition co
APPLICATION STA
During the application or deployment stage evaluate the performance of current architectu As shown in Figure 2 , the most effective re confidence that a detector alarm indicates a tr increase confidence in the system is to optim detectors in the network will alarm if an agent of a detector siting optimization generated by detectors are optimally sited in order to minim undetected attack. Each point on the figure benefit of adding additional detectors to the ar after deploying six detectors. Marginal bene number of people protected per additional de designers, and response planners can better all performance chart that displays systems with equivalent pe point on the plot provides identical system performance by extracting data points from performance curves, such as salities averted). It is important to highlight that each perfo esponse at a specific detection time; therefore, many perf needed to create the iso-performance chart featured be d as follows: a detection system that contains a sensitivity entical system performance to a system that contains a sen Using an iso-performance plot, the system performanc ompared and each system's ability to satisfy the overa ing a constant performance space for a new detection system. Eve at the new detection system performs equivalently to a reference is figure is a surrogate for number of detectors and would be a ost and annual operational costs.
AGE: EFFICIENT ALLOCATION OF ASSET
of detector development, the end-to-end approach can b ures and calculate optimal detector locations to maximize sy esponse actions are typically "high-consequence"; therefo rue threat to public health is critically important. One pote mize detector locations so that a high probability exists th is released anywhere within the facility. Figure 7 provides y the FacDAC toolset. In the figure, the positions for a g mize the largest fraction of population that would be infec is an individually optimized detector architecture. It is rchitecture begins to saturate and a point of diminishing re fit tables can be constructed to translate changes in the FP tector deployed. Informed by these analyses program ma locate resources to provide the broadest coverage for a given
erformance. An , is provided in s Figure 4a , at a ormance curve is formance curves elow. The isoof 5, a detection nsitivity of 10, a ce of competing all performance ery S be employed to ystem coverage. ore, having high ential method to hat one or more s sample outputs given number of cted (FPI) in an evident that the eturns is reached PI metric to the anagers, detector n situation. to provide the greatest amoun optimized detector configura the number of additional peo 50,000.
In conclusion, employing an end-to-end appro defensible, and realistic definitions. The utilit development process including: providing te assisting in system performance evaluation an optimizing asset allocation for chosen detect Destruction Decision Analysis Capability (F applications of its use were illustrated using Homeland Security.
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